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Abstract Williamson has argued against scepticism concerning our metaphysically
modal knowledge, by arguing that standard patterns of suppositional reasoning to
counterfactual conclusions provide reliable sources of correct ascriptions of possi-
bility and necessity. The paper argues that, while Williamson’s claims relating to
necessity may well be right, he has not provided adequate reasons for thinking that
the familiar modes of counterfactual reasoning to which he points generalise to
provide a decent route to ascriptions of possibility. The paper also explores another
path to ascriptions of possibility that may be extracted from Williamson’s ideas,
before briefly considering the general status of counterfactual reasoning in relation
to our knowledge of possibilities.
Keywords Modal epistemology  Possibility  Counterfactuals  Suppositions 
Knowledge  Williamson
1 Introduction
We know that it is not just true that 2 ? 2 = 4, but that it could not be false that
2 ? 2 = 4; and we know that, although there are currently over 7 billion people
living on the surface of this planet, there could have been under 3 million. The
proposition that 2 ? 2 = 4 is thus metaphysically necessary, while the proposition
that there are under 3 million people living on the earth at the current time is
metaphysically possible. How do we get our knowledge that certain propositions are
not just actually true but necessary? And how do we get our knowledge that certain
propositions which are actually false yet could have been true?
& Dominic Gregory
d.gregory@sheffield.ac.uk
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, 45 Victoria Street, Sheffield S3 7QB, UK
123
Philos Stud
DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0707-2
In relatively recent work, Williamson has sought to shed light on our ascriptions
of the metaphysical modalities.1 He suggests that philosophical appeals to, say,
intuition as a source of our beliefs about (metaphysical2) possibility and necessity
arise from a failure to see the wider context within which our thoughts about the
metaphysical modalities take place, and that they thereby make our claims to
metaphysically modal knowledge seem needlessly shady. Rather, he argues, ‘the
ordinary cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals carries with it the
cognitive capacity to handle metaphysical modality’ (Williamson 2007b, 136).
The following two sections present Williamson’s views in more detail. Section 2
presents some background materials relating to the epistemology of counterfactuals
and their negations, while Sect. 3 explains how Williamson extends those materials
to generate ideas relating to our ascriptions of the metaphysical modalities.
Sections 4 and 5 argue against Williamson’s claim to have drawn the sting from
scepticism about our knowledge of what is metaphysically possible, by having
shown that the reliability of certain forms of argument leading to ascriptions of
possibility is a mere corollary of the reliability of a more general pattern of
reasoning that we habitually employ in support of denials of counterfactual
conditionals.
Section 6 then explores another potential route to ascriptions of possibility that is
easily extracted from Williamson’s ideas. Section 7 concludes: it suggests that,
while counterfactual reasoning doubtless has crucial roles to play in extending our
prior knowledge of possibilities, the amount of philosophical light that it can shed
upon our knowledge of possibility in general is limited.
2 Williamson on counterfactual knowledge
Suppose that one wishes to assess whether, if A were to be the case, B would be too
(‘A h! B’). Williamson notes that one might ‘schematise a typical overall process
of evaluating a counterfactual conditional thus: one supposes the antecedent and
develops the supposition… To a first approximation: one asserts the counterfactual
conditional if and only if the development eventually leads one to add the
consequent’ (Williamson 2007b, 152–153).
But, as Williamson remarks, this schematisation oversimplifies things somewhat,
because we often rehearse a variety of scenarios in which the antecedent of a given
counterfactual conditional obtains. We may consider various different scenarios in
which the antecedent holds good, yet which are all pretty close to actuality,
checking to see whether the consequent continues to obtain under those slight
variations in the initial conditions. ‘Robustness in the result under such minor
perturbations supports a higher degree of confidence’ (Williamson 2007b, 153) in
the truth of the relevant counterfactual conditional, by suggesting that the
1 See, in particular, Williamson (2007b), chapter 5; see also his (2007a). It is clear that any proposition
that is actually true is possible, so there are many ascriptions of possibility that are not remotely
mysterious; the interesting cases feature propositions that are not believed actually to be true.
2 I will simply talk of ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ from this point onwards.
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consequent flows from the antecedent in a relatively wide range of possible
circumstances.
Suppose that, after running through a range of iterations of the above process
using the propositions A and B, we find that our developments of initial supposition
A are not tending to yield B. We can hardly immediately conclude that it is false
that, if A were to be the case, B would be too. Maybe we have not sufficiently
explored the counterfactual consequences of A, for instance; or maybe we lack some
item of relevant background knowledge that would lead us to see a connection
between A and B (Williamson 2007b, 153). The process of exploring the
counterfactual consequences of initial suppositions thus does not lead as straight-
forwardly to denials of counterfactual conditionals as it does to their assertions.
But, while we often cannot be certain that some version of the foregoing process
would not eventually lead us from initial supposition A to proposition B, Williamson
holds that the process nonetheless commonly does put us ‘in a position to deny
counterfactual conditionals’ (Williamson 2007b, 155). He appeals to a nice analogy
with the denials of existential claims: we may be in a position to deny that there are
Fs even though we are not certain that our search for Fs has been exhaustive
(Williamson 2007b, 154).
Williamson notes that we draw upon an impressive array of cognitive resources
when evaluating counterfactual conditionals using the processes just described. So,
one of the most striking aspects of our engagement with counterfactuals is the role
that our imaginations play in relation to our evaluations of them. (If I want to
figure out what would happen if someone were to drop a tennis ball from some
window, for instance, I might rehearse visual mental imagery that shows the course,
and then the aftermath, of a tennis ball’s descent from the window3.) But there are
all sorts of other tools that we may use in the course of counterfactual thought: we
may employ mathematical reasoning, for instance, or we may draw upon the fruits
of scientific discoveries that other people have communicated to us.
The flexibility and power of the mental resources that we bring to bear upon
counterfactual conditionals are unsurprising, given the importance of the latter to
‘empirical thought in general’; our concern with counterfactuals is closely linked to
our concern with causal connections, for instance, and to the scientific enterprise of
uncovering natural laws (Williamson 2007b, 140–141). Indeed, the significant roles
played by counterfactual conditionals and their negations in relation to numerous
aspects of empirical thought mean that ‘[o]ur overall capacity for somewhat reliable
thought about counterfactual possibilities is hardly surprising’ (Williamson 2007b,
137); they mean, too, that it would be impossible to stop a generally sceptical
attitude towards our supposed knowledge of counterfactual matters from metamor-
phosing into an unacceptably strong scepticism about many further aspects of
empirical thought (Williamson 2007b, 141).
3 Williamson—rightly, I think—resists the claim that these sorts of uses of visual mental imagery posit
‘the presence of [an] observer [as] part of the content’ of the relevant imaginative acts (2007b, p. 149); see
Gregory (2010, 2013) for a detailed account of the nature of the contents of visual mental images which
bears out this point.
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In the light of all that, let’s follow Williamson in assuming that ‘we have non-
trivial knowledge’ of counterfactual conditionals and their negations (Williamson
2007b, 141). More specifically, let’s assume that our armoury of familiar methods
for teasing out the counterfactual consequences of initial suppositions is pretty
reliable, and that it commonly leads us to know that substantive counterfactual
conditionals are true. And let’s also assume—most crucially, for what follows—that
we are indeed often ‘in a position to deny counterfactual conditionals’, because we
are often in a position to be confident that our own inability reliably to reach a
counterfactual conditional’s consequent, when exploring the counterfactual conse-
quences of its antecedent, reflects the lack of a counterfactual connection between
the two claims, rather than just shortcomings in our investigations.
3 Williamson on modal knowledge
The previous section did not touch directly upon our beliefs concerning whether
propositions are possible or necessary. But Williamson argues that the points about
counterfactual knowledge just rehearsed can swiftly be brought to bear upon the
latter, once we invoke the following two principles:4
Að Þh A! Bð Þ ! Ah!Bð Þ
Bð Þ Ah!Bð Þ ! ðA! BÞ
For (A) and (B), in tandem with a few moves employing elementary modal and
propositional logic, are known to generate a range of ‘necessary and sufficient
conditions for necessity and possibility in terms of the counterfactual conditional’
(Williamson 2007b, 156).5 More specifically, take some contradiction \.6 Then,
using (A) and (B), we get:
ðNec?ÞhA$ ð:Ah!?Þ
ðPoss?Þ  A$ :ðAh!?Þ
Moreover, the status of :A as contradictory to A means that we have7:
4 Lowe objects to Williamson’s use of (A), as Lowe holds that ‘A h! B’ is equivalent to ‘(h(A ?
B)&(A_hB)) (Lowe 2012, 9). While Lowe’s alternative account of the counterfactual conditional
avoids certain troublesome implications of the more standard approach employed by Williamson—such
as the need to regard counterfactuals with impossible antecedents as vacuously true—it faces issues of its
own: for any impossible proposition A, for instance, Lowe has to deny that (A h! A).
5 See (Williamson 2007b, 156–159) for the reasoning needed to generate the equivalences.
6 Precisely what it is for a proposition to be a ‘contradiction’—whether ‘0 = 1’ counts, for instance, or
whether contradictions are merely substitution instances of logical falsehoods of the propositional
calculus—does not really matter for what follows; the arguments below merely require that contradictions
are impossible.
7 The derivations of (Nec:A) and (Poss:A) employ the reflexivity of the counterfactual conditional along
with a ‘closure principle’ formulated at (Williamson 2007b, 143–144).
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ðNec:AÞhA$ ð:Ah!AÞ
ðPoss:AÞ  A$ :ðAh!:AÞ
Finally, the use of propositional quantification gives the following principles, which
do not play a major role in Williamson’s discussion, but to the second of which I
will return in this paper’s penultimate section:
ðNec8ÞhA$ 8p ph!Að Þ
ðPoss9Þ  A$ 9p:ðph!:AÞ
Given the first four of the above equivalences, it seems that we may use the
processes of counterfactual thought considered in the previous section to arrive at
ascriptions of the metaphysical modalities that tend to be correct.
So, for instance, ‘by [(Nec\)], we assert hA when our counterfactual
development of the supposition :A robustly yields a contradiction; … [and by
(Poss\),] we assert A when our counterfactual development of the supposition
A does not robustly yield a contradiction (and we do not attribute the failure to a
defect in our search)’ (Williamson 2007b, 163). But, given the virtues of the general
processes of reasoning instanced in those cases, it may seem that we will then
reliably end up with true ascriptions of necessity and of possibility. Likewise, by
(Nec:A), we may assert hA ‘when our counterfactual development of the
supposition :A robustly yields [A]’; and, by (Poss:A), we may assert A ‘when
our counterfactual development of the supposition A does not robustly yield
[:A] (and we do not attribute the failure to a defect in our search)’. Williamson
accordingly concludes that ‘[g]eneral scepticism in the epistemology of metaphys-
ical modality without general scepticism in the epistemology of counterfactuals’—
what he rightly characterises as ‘an extravagant scepticism’ (Williamson 2007b,
178)—‘is unmotivated’ (Williamson 2007b, 164–165).
There are numerous questions that might be raised at this juncture. Are there
reasons for rejecting the various equivalences involving the metaphysical modalities
that were listed above?8 Just how far are Williamson’s ideas meant to track the
methods that we actually use to arrive at ascriptions of the metaphysical
modalities?9 And, if they are hoped to provide a description of how we actually
tend to reason, what sort of access are ordinary people meant to have to the
equivalences that Williamson exploits?10 But for our purposes those questions may
be put aside.
8 Lowe’s rejection of (A) above—see fn. 4—leads him to reject each of the earlier equivalences, for
instance.
9 Jenkins (2008) suggests that Williamson overstates the extent to which we actually rely upon
counterfactual reasoning in arriving at ascriptions of the metaphysical modalities; and Kroedel (2012)
argues that empirical evidence conflicts with the claim that we generally form modal beliefs in the
manner described by Williamson. Yli-Vakkuri (2013) notes that one of Williamson’s main concerns is to
address sceptical worries concerning our ability to acquire modal knowledge, however, and that his
purported routes to modal knowledge may nonetheless be relevant to that aim.
10 Williamson rightly rejects the idea that any of those various equivalences capture synonymy
relationships, for instance (2007b, 160).
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Let’s allow that each of the earlier equivalences is correct. Recall, too, our
previous assumption that the schematic processes of counterfactual reasoning
described in the preceding section have the virtues which Williamson claims for
them. Finally, I am happy to allow that we may reliably use (Nec\) and (Nec:A) to
arrive at correct ascriptions of necessity. Against the backdrop of those various
assumptions, though, just how confident should we be in basing ascriptions of
possibility upon Williamsonian uses of (Poss\) and (Poss:A)?
4 Denying counterfactual conditionals
As we have seen, Williamson claims that ‘our fallible imaginative evaluation of
counterfactuals has a conceivability test for possibility… built in as [a] fallible
special [case]’: in line with (Poss\), ‘we assert A when our counterfactual
development of the supposition A does not robustly yield a contradiction (and we do
not attribute the failure to a defect in our search)’ (Williamson 2007b, 163). Given a
proposition A which has passed that test—that is, given a proposition A for which an
adequate range of developments of the supposition that A has not robustly yielded a
contradiction—I shall say that A has passed the \-search test.
As also noted above, an analogous test for possibility may be based upon
(Poss:A): ‘we assert A when our counterfactual development of the supposition
A does not robustly yield [:A] (and we do not attribute the failure to a defect in our
search)’. A proposition which has passed that last test—that is, a proposition A for
which an adequate range of developments of the supposition that A has not robustly
yielded :A—has passed the :A-search test.
Here are some simple grounds on which someone might deny that we have
reason to hold that a proposition’s having passed one of those ‘search tests’
indicates its possibility. Suppose that proposition A has passed, say, the \-search
test. That tells us that a satisfactory range of developments of the supposition that A
has not robustly led us to a contradiction. But there might still be some contradiction
\ such that A h! \ is true. For the truth of, say, A h! (A&:A) hardly itself
requires that we will be able to employ our reasoning powers to reveal the
counterfactual connection between A and (A&:A)!
That response is simplistic, of course. Williamson is fully aware that there is a
gap between our failure to uncover proposition B, in the course of adequately
developing the supposition that A, and the falsity of the counterfactual conditional A
h! B. Our failure robustly to arrive at B, in the course of satisfactorily developing
the supposition that A, nonetheless surely does commonly line up with the falsity of
A h! B; to claim otherwise is to invite corrosive sceptical worries about the
grounds for many of our counterfactual beliefs. A mere confidence in our customary
epistemic practices may thus seem to bear with it a commitment to the utility of the
previous ‘search tests’ as guides to possibility.
That is too quick, however. The proposed uses of the search tests are indeed
consonant with the manner in which we often reason to the falsity of counterfactual
conditionals. But that does not in itself vindicate the envisaged uses of the tests. For
it might be that, say, the counterfactual conditionals of the form A h! \ that we
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are meant to deny, given propositions that have passed the \-search test, are
relevantly different to the preponderance of those counterfactual conditionals that
we are led to deny when we use analogous reasoning in other contexts. Are there
any reasons for thinking that to be so?
That question is addressed in the next section. To lay the ground for that
discussion, it will be worthwhile reflecting initially upon another one: why might
our failure robustly to arrive at proposition B, in the course of satisfactorily
developing the supposition that A, tend to indicate the falsity of A h! B? There are
certain rather compelling thoughts that arise naturally in response to that question.
Suppose that you wish to assess whether, if the North Sea were suddenly to rise
by 10 cm next year, the people of Rutland would swiftly demand secession from the
United Kingdom. You would use certain parts of your explicit and implicit
knowledge of the world in reasoning from your initial supposition: you would call
upon, say, your awareness of the causal connections between slight rises in sea
levels and the physical conditions prevailing in the East Midlands; of the political
mood currently dominant among Rutland’s populace; and of the potential
interactions between the likely physical changes resulting from the North Sea’s
greater depth and the hopes and desires of Rutland’s people.
Suppose that you use that rich array of known facts in repeatedly and diligently
reasoning from the supposition that the North Sea will suddenly rise by 10 cm next
year. But suppose, too, that your developments of the supposition do not robustly
lead to the proposition that Rutland will quickly aim to leave the United Kingdom.
Your investigations have hopefully taken into account the various factors that would
be likely to connect Rutland’s socio-political landscape with the hypothesised
sudden rise in the North Sea’s levels. But, if they have taken them all into account,
the failure of your repeated attempts reliably to get from your initial supposition to
revolutionary demands from Rutlanders may reasonably be taken to indicate the
falsity of the counterfactual that you are considering.
More generally, we may follow Williamson in holding that our tendency to deny
a counterfactual conditional A h! B, in the wake of our failure robustly to get to
B after having adequately developed the supposition that A, will reliably but not
infallibly lead us to true beliefs. For—and here we may appeal to a reasonable
optimism about our epistemological circumstances that dogged sceptics will
obviously spurn—our developments of initial suppositions, in the course of
passages of counterfactual reasoning, tend to be shaped by our responsiveness to the
myriad factors that would in fact interact with the truth of the relevant suppositions,
to yield their characteristic counterfactual consequences.
Yet those heartening points themselves suggest that there will be limits to the
circumstances in which we can trust the inferential tendency to which they relate.
Suppose, for instance, that we are presented with a bunch of counterfactual
conditionals whose truth-values are fixed in a manner that looks set to make
irrelevant the sorts of factors which we are apt to exploit in assessing counterfac-
tuals. Then the considerations that justify our confidence in the reliability of our
general tendency to deny counterfactual conditionals, when we do not robustly get
to their consequents in the course of an adequate range of suppositional
developments of their antecedents, will not justify a parallel level of confidence
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in the reliability of that inferential method in the particular case of those
counterfactuals in the given bunch.
The next section brings those points to bear upon the standing of the earlier
search tests as guides to possibility.
5 Counterfactual reasoning and possibility
Consider some proposition P: the proposition that more than 7 million people live in
Sheffield, say. And consider some contradiction \: the proposition that (0 = 0 and
0 = 0), for instance. As we have seen, each of the counterfactual conditionals P
h! \ and P h! :P holds just in case P is false. A brief consideration of the
reasoning that demonstrates those equivalences reveals that the truth-values of P
h! \ and P h! :P can very straightforwardly be traced back to the truth-value
of P plus, respectively, the status of \ as a contradiction and the status of :P as
contradictory to P.
Imagine that you were to run the \-search test on P. You start by supposing that
more than 7 million people live in Sheffield. You carefully and sensibly explore the
counterfactual consequences of that supposition: you think about what the presence
of 7 million people in Sheffield would mean for the city’s physical state and
infrastructure; what the effects would be on Yorkshire more widely; and so on.
Suppose that your investigations do not robustly carry you to a contradiction,
leading you to conclude in particular that :(P h! \). How approvingly should we
regard the form of inference that you have employed?
The inference looks fine when viewed from sufficiently far away: we often deny
counterfactual conditionals on the basis of broadly similar reasoning, as Williamson
has noted. But the inference looks much less appealing when seen from closer to
hand. In particular, it looks a little suspect once we take into account the nature of
the counterfactual conditional involved in its conclusion.
For any A whatsoever, the truth-value of A, plus the status of various
propositions as themselves contradictions or as contradictory to A, immediately
settles the truth-value of each of the infinitely many counterfactual conditionals that
has A as antecedent and either :A or some contradiction as consequent: each of
them is true just in case A is false. Given an arbitrary such true conditional A
h! B, then, it is very unclear why one would expect to be able robustly to reach B,
upon initially supposing that A, when engaged in the sort of suppositional reasoning
that we standardly employ when assessing counterfactual conditionals. For why
shouldn’t the truth-value of A h! B merely reflect the truth-value of A along with,
say, B’s standing as a contradiction, rather than any facts involving the sorts of
connections to which we generally attend in counterfactual reasoning?
So, suppose that P h! \, because no more than 7 million people could live in
Sheffield and because of the status of (0 = 0 and 0 = 0) as a contradiction. Why
would one expect that fact also to be reflected in one’s ability robustly to reach
(0 = 0 and 0 = 0) on the basis of decent developments of the supposition that more
than 7 million people live in Sheffield? After all, the sorts of considerations that we
would actually be likely to call upon in developing that supposition, and which we
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are generally rather skilled at employing, look unlikely to take us very naturally to
conclusions relating to the identity of 0. (Our sensitivity to this sort of point is surely
reflected in the rather unintuitive nature of the claim that, for every impossible A, A
h! \.)
The previous remarks related to a specific contradiction, but it was an arbitrary
one; they illustrate an entirely general point. The truth-values of most of the
counterfactuals that we assess in everyday life, and which matter for practical
purposes, are underwritten by various sorts of facts involving relationships to which
we are thankfully sensitive when we develop suppositions. By contrast, it is very
unclear why one would think that impossible propositions will be liable to generate
contradictions along lines of influence that will be similarly accessible to us;
certainly, Williamson has not provided any reasons for thinking that they will. If
they are not prone to do so, though, the fact that a proposition passes the \-search
test will not be a good sign of its possibility.
Now, the foregoing considerations evidently do not show that the \-search test is
not a reliable test for possibility. It may be that, for instance, profound truths
concerning the foundations of the metaphysical modalities mean that impossible
propositions will indeed tend to yield contradictions that are accessible using tried
and tested ordinary patterns of counterfactual reasoning. And, in that case, the fact
that a proposition passes the \-search test will in fact be a reliable indicator of its
possibility. Don’t the previous considerations therefore merely indicate a small
lacuna in Williamson’s arguments, rather than a significant problem for them?
The situation is somewhat serious than that. Williamson has claimed to show
why scepticism concerning the reliability of our ascriptions of the metaphysical
modalities is untenable, at least for reasonable people like us: the space between our
everyday practices of counterfactual reasoning and Williamson’s methods for
generating beliefs involving the metaphysical modalities is meant to be so small that
the sceptic cannot hope to prise them apart. Yet the gap between them, at least in the
case of ascriptions of metaphysical possibility, actually looks to be fairly
substantial, for the following reasons.
We have seen that, if one wishes to assimilate the reliability of Williamson’s
process for arriving at ascriptions of metaphysical possibility to the reliability of a
standard process for arriving at denials of counterfactual conditionals, one must
appeal to a highly general thesis concerning impossibilities. But it is very hard to see
how one could justify the latter thesis—the view that impossibilities will tend to
generate contradictions by means of paths that our epistemic powers make available
to us—without employing relatively recondite philosophical claims about the
metaphysical modalities. In particular, some metaphysical-cum-epistemological
story about the relationships between the grounds of modal truth and our epistemic
capacities would seem to be required.
Yet such abstruse philosophical matters play no apparent part in convincing us of
the reliability of our handling of counterfactual conditionals in quotidian contexts:
Williamson himself cites rather plausible evolutionary considerations in that
connection, for instance. Those who are inclined towards scepticism concerning our
knowledge of the metaphysical modalities therefore look to be able to resist
Williamson’s attempted assimilation of ascriptions of metaphysical possibility to
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everyday patterns of counterfactual reasoning. For they may insist—not unreason-
ably, and hardly extravagantly—that, although our ordinary uses of counterfactual
reasoning work well, our philosophical reflections upon modal metaphysics and its
connections to our epistemological powers are much less trustworthy.11
Similar points apply to the :A-search test. The truth-value of any counterfactual
of the form A h! :A is determined by the modal status of A and by the fact that
:A contradicts A. There are thus no evident reasons for thinking—and, again,
Williamson has not provided any reasons for thinking—that there will standardly be
some route, one that follows the sorts of paths which we skilfully traverse in the
course of typical passages of counterfactual reasoning, from an impossible
proposition to its own negation. If there is not generally any such route, however,
the fact that a proposition passes the :A-search test will not be a good sign of its
possibility.
While we may reasonably have a fair degree of confidence in the general
reliability of the methods for reaching denials of counterfactual conditionals
described by Williamson, then, we have not been provided with good reasons for
placing a similar level of confidence in the reliability of the particular uses of those
methods that Williamson proposes as ways of generating beliefs about possibility.
In particular, the counterfactual conditionals involved in Williamson’s uses of the
methods have a very distinctive character, because their truth-values are entirely
determined by the modal status of their antecedents and by the status of their
consequents as either contradictions or contradictory to their antecedents. And their
unusual nature undermines the thought that our general skill in distinguishing false
counterfactual conditionals from true ones ensures that we will also be good at
identifying false counterfactuals of the relevant types.
To conclude this section, it is worth emphasising that the previous argument
should not be conflated with an argument to the effect that the contents of
counterfactual conditionals of the forms A h! \ and A h! :A are just plain odd,
and that we therefore cannot be trusted to reason reliably with them. For that last
style of argument is weak: we perhaps do not commonly make claims featuring
unrestricted quantification, for instance, but our ability, in ordinary contexts, to
reason well deductively using restricted quantification surely helps us also to reason
well deductively, in less ordinary contexts, using unrestricted quantifiers.12 The
earlier arguments do not revolve around the mere oddity of the contents of any
counterfactuals at all, however; rather, they focus upon the unusual way in which
the truth-values of a broad family of counterfactuals are determined.
11 Of course, if there is some way of demonstrating beyond all reasonable doubt that impossibilities will
tend to generate contradictions that are accessible to us using ordinary forms of counterfactual reasoning,
the sceptical tendency will be defeated—but who would bet on that?
12 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for suggesting that I should mention this sort of
case. Williamson (2007b, 171) briefly considers an objection to his account that cites the relatively
unusual nature of counterfactual conditionals having the forms A h! \ and A h! :A; he writes that ‘a
general capacity to develop counterfactual suppositions must confer in particular the capacity to develop
those which subsequently turn out to be inconsistent’, which suggests that the relationship between our
ordinary modes of counterfactual reasoning and his method for arriving at ascriptions of possibility lines
up with the type of example provided in the text.
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The issue for Williamson’s approach then is that the reliability of our ordinary
methods of counterfactual reasoning, which have developed in response to
counterfactuals whose truth-values are settled in certain standard ways, may not
extend to ensure our reliable treatment of those counterfactuals whose truth-values
are fixed in this strikingly different manner.13 The analogy with the passage from
reasoning with restricted quantification to reasoning with unrestricted quantification
thus breaks down at a crucial point. For the differences between the ways in which
the truth-values of restricted and unrestricted readings of, say, ‘some apple is tasty’
are determined—in particular, the universality or otherwise of the domain relative to
which the initial quantifier is to be interpreted—do not impinge upon the reliability
of the modes of argumentation that we ordinarily use when we reason deductively
using the existential quantifier.
6 Another way?
The last few sections have focused entirely upon potential uses for (Poss\) and
(Poss:A). What about the remaining principle concerning possibility that was
introduced earlier, namely (PossA) (‘A$Ap:(p h! :A)’)?14
It was granted above that the general form of reasoning to negated counterfactual
conditionals emphasised by Williamson provides a decent way of arriving at denials
of counterfactual conditionals. Yet, if one has a reliable method for forming beliefs
of the form :(B h! :A), one can evidently also draw conclusions of the form
Ap:(p h! :A) that will reliably be true. By (PossA), though, the contents of those
last beliefs are equivalent to propositions of the form A. Someone who wishes to
deny that (PossA) may be used in reliably arriving at correct ascriptions of possibility
must therefore take issue with at least some of the aspects of Williamson’s position
that I have happily waved through. Can (PossA) thus be used to vindicate
Williamson’s claims for the special importance of counterfactual reasoning to the
epistemology of metaphysical possibility?
In the right circumstances, some of the patterns of counterfactual thought
described by Williamson evidently are capable of generating ascriptions of
possibility that tend to be correct. We often form beliefs of the form B h! A by
13 Williamson (2007b, 171) suggests that, to the extent that our general capacity to develop
counterfactual suppositions is ‘not of uniform reliability’, those variations depend primarily upon the
nature of the antecedents of the relevant counterfactuals; we are perhaps poor at assessing counterfactuals
featuring exotic antecedents of the sorts used in particularly wild philosophical thought-experiments, for
instance. The arguments in the main text indicate another potential source of unreliability here, however;
namely, appropriate differences in the ways that the truth-values of families of counterfactual conditionals
are determined.
14 Kroedel (2012) suggests that (PossA) provides a better basis for ascriptions of possibility than (Poss\)
and (Poss:A). His arguments depend upon following Lewis (1973) in treating :(B h! :A) as
corresponding to the English locution ‘A might be true if B were true’, however; yet the mere claim that A
might be true if B were true does not itself entail both the possibility of A and the possibility of B, as :(B
h! :A) does. (If it were the case that 0 = 1, for instance, then it might be the case that 0 = 1.) More
generally, Lewis’s reading of :(B h! :A) only really has any plausibility when one restricts one’s
attention to negated counterfactuals whose antecedents are possible, as DeRose (1999, fn.3) also remarks.
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investigating the counterfactual consequences of suppositions, for example, using
the general processes of suppositional reasoning exploited by Williamson in relation
to (Nec\) and (Nec:A). But suppose that the suppositions that kick off those
processes of reasoning tend to be possible. Then, given also that the counterfactual
conclusions B h! A resulting from those passages of reasoning are generally true,
it follows that subsequent beliefs to the effect that A will tend to be correct. (Recall
principle (B) above, which we may be rewritten as ‘(B h! A) ? (B ? A)’.)
Modes of counterfactual reasoning therefore certainly do have the potential,
under the right conditions, of generating ascriptions of possibility that tend to be
correct. And perhaps the process described at the start of this section, featuring
(PossA), is one of those happy cases in which the appropriate conditions are actually
in place. But that is not in itself a philosophically potent fact: the method of
ascribing possibility to each proposition that is validly deducible from a proposition
expressed within a book in Denmark will also reliably generate correct ascriptions
of possibility, for instance, so long as most of those last propositions happen to be
possible. Yet, even if that last condition holds, the ‘Danish method’ seems to be of
minor importance to modal epistemology.
Williamson’s proposed deployments of (Poss\) and (Poss:A) are much more
interesting, however. For they are not meant simply to exploit the transmission of
possibility from the propositions in one bunch to those in another. His arguments are
instead intended to convince us that natural extensions of commonplace processes
of counterfactual thought will supply a reliable basis for ascriptions of possibility,
just because of the utility, within ordinary contexts, of the mundane methods in
question. They accordingly hold out the promise of enabling us to see how we may
reliably arrive at correct ascriptions of possibility, without our needing to assume—
and any sensible sceptic would balk at this!—that the propositions used as input to
the relevant processes of reasoning are themselves usually possible.
Let’s return to the putatively reliable method described at the start of this section,
for generating ascriptions of possibility by means of (PossA). That process goes via
intermediate conclusions of the form :(B h! :A). Those intermediate conclusions
result from episodes in which one fails robustly to reach :A on the basis of adequate
developments of an initial supposition that B: it is being assumed, crucially, that
one’s failure to reach :A in those circumstances tends to indicate the falsity of the
relevant counterfactual conditionals (B h! :A). (PossA) is then to be applied,
leading reliably to true conclusions of the form A.
But, merely by (A) above (which may be rewritten as ‘h(B ? A) ? (B
h! A)’) and by the logic of the material conditional, absolutely every counter-
factual conditional with an impossible antecedent is true; for h(B ? A) holds
whenever B is impossible. Given some B which is impossible, it is hence unclear
why one would think that the truth of a given counterfactual conditional (Bh! :A)
would depend upon anything more than B’s standing as an impossibility. In
particular—to return to a familiar theme—it is unclear why one would think that, in
this rather special sort of case, the truth of (Bh! :A) is likely to be reflected in the
existence of some route, one that follows the sorts of paths that we are prone to trace
in the course of episodes of counterfactual reasoning, from the supposition that B to
the conclusion that :A.
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Our justification for thinking that we are typically right to conclude that :(B
h! :A), when we fail robustly to reach :A in the light of an adequate range of
developments of the initial supposition that B, thus depends upon our being entitled
to assume that the relevant initial suppositions are generally possible. The (PossA)-
employing method for reaching ascriptions of possibility suggested above, which
proceeds via intermediate conclusions of the form :(B h! :A), therefore cannot
single-handedly realise Williamson’s visions for the crucial role of counterfactual
reasoning in modal epistemology. For, like the ‘Danish method’ described above, it
is merely yet another example of a method for forming beliefs about possibility that
may well be reliable, but in whose reliability we may reasonably believe only if we
are already allowed to accept that the propositions which are fed into the relevant
process are apt to be possible.
7 Conclusion
Williamson aims to show how ‘a plausible non-skeptical epistemology of
metaphysical modality’ may ‘subsume our capacity to discriminate metaphysical
possibilities from metaphysical impossibilities under more general cognitive
capacities used in ordinary life’ (Williamson 2007b, 136). To that end, he uses
counterfactual conditionals to formulate a range of equivalences for ascriptions of
the metaphysical modalities; and he argues that two of the equivalences—(Poss\)
and (Poss:A)—may be combined with a familiar process of counterfactual reasoning
from suppositions to yield ascriptions of possibility that are reliably correct, going
via negated counterfactual conditional conclusions of the forms :(A h! \) and
:(A h! :A).
It was noted, however, that we have not been given reasons for thinking that the
truth-values of the relevant counterfactual conditionals will typically depend upon
any more than the modal status of A along with, respectively, the standing of \ as a
contradiction and the status of :A as contradictory to A. But there are therefore also
no apparent reasons for thinking that our uses of the forms of counterfactual
reasoning identified by Williamson will reliably lead us to correct denials of
counterfactual conditionals of the relevant kinds, and thus to correct ascriptions of
possibility. For the general reliability of our uses of those styles of reasoning reflects
the sorts of counterfactual conditionals with which we have most to do in everyday
life, whose truth-values derive from various types of facts that may well typically be
irrelevant to the truth-values of the unusual counterfactual conditionals that
Williamson deploys.
One might seek to close this gap in Williamson’s arguments, by appealing to
substantial metaphysical and epistemological theses about impossibility. But this
strategy looks set to undermine one of the main dialectical advantages that
Williamson claims for his ideas. For his arguments were meant to demonstrate that
scepticism about our knowledge of metaphysical possibility naturally generalises to
scepticism about our knowledge of everyday counterfactual matters. Yet, if
Williamson’s arguments need ultimately to appeal to contentious philosophical
theses concerning modality, the way is surely open once again for sceptics to
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endorse our everyday claims to counterfactual knowledge while spurning our claims
to know much about what is metaphysically possible.
The previous section considered a potential way of using another equivalence
stated by Williamson—namely, (PossA)—to generate ascriptions of possibility that
are reliably correct. It was noted that, while the described method may well produce
beliefs about possibility that tend to be right, our justification for holding that it does
so depends upon our being entitled to assume the customary possibility of the
propositions that serve as the starting-points of applications of the relevant process.
The method may therefore be a handy way of reliably getting from possible truths to
correct ascriptions of possibility—which is a good thing—but the method shares
that feature with very many other potential ways of arriving at ascriptions of
possibility that lack any special importance for modal epistemology.
It is worth emphasising that the preceding discussion has focused solely upon
Williamson’s claims about the potential utility of counterfactual reasoning in
generating ascriptions of possibility; the view that one may demonstrate that A is
necessary by showing that (:Ah! \) holds, or that (:Ah! A) does, seems to me
to be right, and to fit nicely with ways in which we actually do reason. By contrast, I
think that Williamson’s claims concerning counterfactual reasoning and ascriptions
of possibility fit less well with our actual practices: the earlier critical discussion of
Williamson’s approach thus is not meant to cast any sceptical aspersions upon our
customary modes of reasoning.
We very often hold that it is possible that B, on the grounds that if A were the
case then B would also be the case, where we already accept that A is possible. I
think that there could be pink horses, for instance, because I can visualise scenes
containing suitably coloured animals and because I take it that the sorts of situations
that I can visualise are generally possible. But, although counterfactual reasoning is
thus often used in passing from previously accepted ascriptions of possibility to new
ones, it typically seems just to play a bridging role. It would be unusual, I think, to
find someone who quite consciously sought to support an ascription of possibility by
reasoning to the conclusion that, say, :(A h! :A), rather than by seeking to
describe a scenario that he or she judges to be possible and to be one in which
A would obtain.
It has to be acknowledged, though, that aspects of Williamson’s suppositional
processes of reasoning to ascriptions of possibility are familiar. One might well
mention one’s inability to see how any contradictions would flow from A’s truth,
when contending that A is possible. But that does not necessarily indicate one’s tacit
employment of the patterns of reasoning that Williamson describes. We seem
standardly to have a fairly liberal attitude towards possibility: we ascribe possibility
to a proposition unless we can see compelling reasons for denying that it is possible.
One might therefore mention A’s apparent lack of contradictory consequences
simply to raise the question why anyone would deny that A is possible, rather than as
providing substantial support for the conclusion that :(A h! \).
To conclude, while counterfactual reasoning surely has a significant role to play
in generating knowledge of necessity, its role in relation to knowledge of possibility
is less fundamental. We are able to use counterfactuals in passing from old
ascriptions of possibility to new ones; and counterfactual conditionals may carry us
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from there to potentially endless further beliefs about possibility. But, if we are to
understand how the whole journey gets underway, we must use more than reflection
upon counterfactual reasoning alone.
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